Explainer · DNS and cloud exposure

What is a subdomain takeover?

A subdomain takeover is when an attacker gains control of one of your subdomains because its DNS record still points to an external service you stopped using, such as a deleted cloud storage bucket or a canceled hosting account. The attacker claims that resource and serves their own content under your domain name.

01 Why it matters

What an attacker gets from a taken-over subdomain

  • Your name, their content

    Visitors, browsers and email filters see your domain. Phishing pages and malicious downloads inherit the trust you built.

  • Cookies and trust rules

    Cookies scoped to the parent domain, such as .acme.example, are sent to the taken-over host. Cross-origin, content security and sign-in redirect rules that trust *.acme.example may trust it too.

  • A valid certificate

    Because the attacker controls what the subdomain serves, they can often pass domain validation and obtain a trusted TLS certificate for it.

  • Easy to miss

    The record was correct when someone created it. It turns dangerous later, when the service behind it is shut down and nobody updates DNS.

02 How it happens

How a subdomain takeover happens

A takeover starts with a dangling DNS record: a record that points at something that no longer exists. A typical sequence:

  1. Your marketing team creates campaign.acme.example as a CNAME to acme-campaign.hosting.example, a site on a third-party platform.
  2. The campaign ends. The site is deleted from the platform, but the CNAME stays in DNS.
  3. The platform lets any customer claim the name acme-campaign.
  4. An attacker claims it, and the platform now serves their content for campaign.acme.example.

Other records fail the same way: A and AAAA records that point at cloud IP addresses you released, such as legacy.acme.example still pointing at 203.0.113.24, which another customer can later be assigned; NS records that delegate a subdomain to a DNS zone you deleted; and CNAMEs to domains that expired and anyone can register.

Many platforms answer requests for an unclaimed resource with a distinctive error, such as “bucket not found” or “no site configured here”. Together with the CNAME target, those responses are the fingerprints that takeover checks look for. Not every match is exploitable: some platforms make the domain owner verify the name before it can be attached.

03 Check yourself

How to check your own domains safely

Check only domains you own or are authorized to test. Do not register resources on third-party platforms to test for a takeover; confirm the facts in your own accounts instead.

  1. Export every zone

    List all CNAME, A, AAAA and NS records across your domains, including those created by other teams, agencies and vendors.

  2. Resolve each target

    Flag CNAMEs whose target does not resolve or sits on a third-party platform, A records for addresses you may no longer hold, and delegations that no longer answer.

  3. Check the response

    Request each flagged name over HTTP and HTTPS. A platform error saying the site, app or bucket does not exist is a strong warning sign.

  4. Confirm in your accounts

    Check in your own platform accounts whether the resource still exists. If it does not, fix the DNS record first and investigate afterward.

04 Fix it

How to fix and prevent subdomain takeover

  • Delete the record, or reclaim the resource. If you still need the subdomain, recreate the resource in your own account. If not, remove the DNS record.
  • Reverse the order of decommissioning. Remove the DNS record first, then delete the service it points to.
  • Give every record an owner. Note who created each entry and why, so cleanup does not depend on memory.
  • Prefer platforms that verify domains. Services that require a TXT record before attaching a custom domain are much harder to take over.
  • Avoid wildcard records that point at third-party platforms. They turn every unused name into a candidate.
  • Watch continuously. Records are created and services retired between audits.

If a takeover is confirmed, also search Certificate Transparency logs for certificates you did not request, have them revoked, and review cookies scoped to the parent domain.

05 Our coverage

How NorthBound covers subdomain takeover

Our attack surface discovery finds subdomains through DNS, certificate transparency, passive sources and HTTP probing, including the ones nobody remembers creating. We check CNAME records against subdomain-takeover fingerprints, and our team reviews each match with you. Discovery repeats, and run-to-run comparison shows new, resolved and resurfaced findings, so a record that starts dangling after a decommission does not wait for next year’s test.

06 FAQ

Questions about subdomain takeover

Is every dangling DNS record exploitable?

No. It depends on whether the platform lets someone else claim the same resource name. Some require domain verification or generate unique names. Remove the record anyway, because platform rules change.

Which DNS records are affected?

Mostly CNAME records, but also A and AAAA records that point at released cloud IP addresses, NS records that delegate to deleted zones, and records that point at expired domains.

Does HTTPS prevent a takeover?

No. Once attackers control what the subdomain serves, they can often obtain a valid certificate for it. Watch Certificate Transparency logs for certificates you did not request.

Find it before an attacker does.

Tell us what you need covered. We will reply from contact@northboundintelligence.com to arrange a scoping call.

Facts on this page verified 11 November 2026.